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INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL TRANSITION IN THAILANDT 
This chapter assesses the relationship between political~administrative 
accountability, civil society and a new form of governance in Thailand, 
following the implementation of the new constitution in 1997. The chapter 
begins with the historical Context, especially rhe democratic transition and 
consolidation that has raken place in the country since 1973, within which 
the notion of accountability and transparency - or good governance -
has emerged as a dominant political discourse in recent years. Secondly, the 
chapter assesses the extent to which the new system of governance has been 
developed in light of the government led by Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra since 2001. It is argued that the issue of creating a new system 
of governance - a more responsive, more transparenr and more accountable 
governance - cannot be separated from the issue of democratic 
consolidation. Thirdly, it notes that globalization provides an impetus for 
the rhetoric of good governance and democracy in Thailand. But as 
globalization has at least two parts: firstly, market forces, or the material, 
with key beneficiaries being capitalisrs; and secondly, the ideational or 
"good governance" - accountability and transparency - which to a 
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considerable degree is a civil society-led counter-force to the increasing 
corporatization of Thai politics. In Thailand, the pro-market forces and 
businessmen-politicians are more dominant, resulting in the erosion of 
accountability and transparency. This chapter thus hypothesizes that the 
new system of governance in Thailand is not being achieved as envisaged by 
the constitution because the capitalist class (or rather a key section of it), in 
collaboration with more conservativelrepressive state agencies, especially 
the police and the Interior Ministry officials - have captured the electoral 
process, the parliament, and thus the government. These new political 
forces are less interested in advancing democratic/participatory governance, 
but more in monopolistic capital accumulation and, at least rhetorically, 
the country's international competitiveness. At the same time, the Thaksin 
government has attempted to curtail the activity of the middle class-based 
civil society groups by, among other things, rallying its support from the 
rural areas based on the ruling party's populist policies. $0, instead of 
participatory governance, Thailand is now developing a "corporatized 
governance". The issue of accountability and transparency is now therefore 
quire problematic, if not totally sidelined. 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE NOTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THAILAND 
Although the democratic system was first introduced in Thailand in 1932 
when a group of intellectuals and military officers staged a coup against King 
Rama VII and demanded a constitution, the first democratic change 
spearheaded by the larger public - intellectuals, bureaucrats, middle class, 
working class, members of the capitalist class - took place in 1973 when the 
student-led uprising toppled the military regime ofThanom-Prapat-Narong 
and ushered in a new era of political pluralism. 
The 1973 event led to an era of great democratic euphoria, with people 
in all sections of the society demanding more political space not only at the 
national level, but also in their places of work and of studies. Freedom, 
liberty, equality, self-governing, human rights promotion, workers' rights and 
peasants' rights were all part of the day-co-day conversation during the time. 
Workers were pitted against their employers, peasants their landlords, students 
their teachers, children their parentS, community members government 
officials. New ideologies proliferated, particularly those which called for 
equality, an end of exploitation and distribution of wealth. Socialism in 
particular was very popular. Radicals were calling for further change in 
society and the political system to bring about a better life for the people. 
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Strikes and demonstrations were daily events. Clashes between the pro- and 
anti-change groups were part of the scene between 1973 and 1976. 
To many, (he country was dearly ungovernable; elected government 
could nOt bring about political stability. The economy was turning from bad 
to worse. The business and the middle classes and the bureaucrats felt 
threatened by what was perceived as a turmoil, rather than a time of newly-
found freedom and democtacy. 
The worsening instabiliry paved the way for the eventual return of the 
military, after three years of democratic experiment, in a bloody coup in 
1976, when scores of student demonstrators were killed. Thai politics once 
again entered the "vicious cycle", with a military government taking over after 
a short period of parliamentary politics. 
The progressive forces, including intellectuals and members of the 
middle class, were disillusioned with the euphoria of 1973, and the return 
of the military-led, bureaucratically dominated governance ,- the 
"bureaucratic polity" - ended hopes of developing democracy further. To 
a lot of them, radical revolution was the only option lefL This led hundreds 
of them to join the then outlawed Communist Parry of Thailand (CPT) in 
the jungle, using the strategy of "forest circling cities" to seize power 
through armed struggle. The country entered a period of great instability, 
with political suppression in the urban areas on the one hand, and the 
increasing thteats and influence from the Communist Party in the rutal 
areas on the othet. But one benevolent military leader - General Prem 
Tinsulanonda, who was known for his integrity, honesty and incorruptability 
- had a different idea. He was an unconventional anti-communist 
campaigner and advocated using political means instead of armed suppression 
against the insurgency, by attempting to tackle the root causes of the 
political discontent including corruption and abuses of power by government 
officials. Prem also put in place programmes for rural development as a 
means to gain support from the rural people. He further expanded his 
political support base by incorporating other non-bureaucratic, non-military 
forces in society into the policymaking process. Prem effectively presented 
himself as more open-minded and more democratic than his military 
predecessors. He brought under his leadership, as a military-backed prime 
minister, representatives of the business sector, intellectuals and technocrats 
to work for the good of the counny. He did not lump progressive intellectuals 
and technocrats together with the radical communists, as previously done 
in the past. Instead he foresaw in these people great potential contributions 
to the country's development, helping expanding his political support. This 
helped enable him to carry out many important programmes not only to 
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stabilize the country but also to advance the coumry in key areas, especially 
economic development. 
Prem became prime minister under a constitution that did not require a 
prime minister (PM) to be an elected member of parliament (MP) and 
allowed the appointed senate to participate in choosing the PM. Even so, 
Prem saw the virtue of allowing political parties and parliament to function. 
As the leader of the military, he also retained his power to appoint senior 
military officers and technocrats to key ministties and prime ministerial 
adv isory posi tio ns, thereby bypassing the po Ii ti cal parties tha t gave 
parliamentary support to him. The manner in which such power was shared 
was known as Thai "half fruit" or "semi-democracy". The semi-democratic 
period nevertheless helped nurture democratic forces. Private sector 
representatives were allowed to participate at the level of policy formulation 
- in the form of corporatist structure. Some called what happened in 
Thailand then a liberal corporatism or a liberal corporatist governance.2 Mter 
eight years as PM, Prem was able to achieve political stability and witnessed 
the end of the CPT - aided by regional and world politics - and promote 
steady economic growth. 
The new-found stability weakened the justification for continued military-
dominated governance. Many saw the country was ready for another 
democratic transition. Civil society groups - intellectuals, members of the 
media and the middle class - again became restless, and when Prem indicated 
that he would continue as PM after a general election, they pur up strong 
resistance. By that time, it was dear that Thailand's democratic discourse had 
become dominant: "democracy is the only game in town". It was clear that 
while the radical path was abandoned, a military-dominated governmen t was 
not welcomed either. 
Prem stepped down, and when, in August 1988, an elected MP, Chatichai 
Choonhavan, who was a leader of a largest political party at that point, was 
chosen by parliamenr to be PM, it was hailed as the arrival of an era of full 
democracy. Chatichai became the first elected prime minister in more than a 
decade. Bur that proved to be a big disappoinrmen t. The Chatichai governmen t 
was dominated by big businesses, which had bough t their way in to parliament 
and who now had the opportunity to break free from the bureaucrats and 
technocrats and to make their own policies. But conflicts of interests were 
rampant, which led to widespread corruption among members of the cabinet. 
Kick-backs involving rhe capitalists cum politicians, giving concessions to 
friends and receiving direct monetary benefits, were rampam. Politicians, 
bureaucrats, and businesspeople alike took advantage of the out-of-date and 
weak laws governing business practices compounded by the absence of accepted 
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norms of political behaviour. Although Chatichai was popular with his 
economic and foreign policies, his ministerial cabinet was sarcastically called 
a "buffet cabinet", a take-what-you-like gtoup of government ministers. 
There was a public outcry against the widespread corruption and abuses of 
power by politicians under the popularly elected government of Prime Minister 
Chatichai Choonhavan during 1988-91. 
The legitimacy of the Chatichai government nosedived, and the military, 
with taci [ suppOrt of reformist forces, staged a coup in 1991 to "dean up" the 
political mess. Thai politics was facing a great paradox: a militaty coup was 
staged to remove a democratically elected government in order to bring about 
good governance. 
One of the major lessons the public learned from the elected government 
of Chatichai was that a popularly elected government did not automatically 
guarantee accountability, transparency and honest public policy making. In 
other words, a popularly elected government does not equal "good governance". 
The understanding was that the coup was only a stop-gap measure - a break 
from an "abused democracy", the kind of democracy that was dominated by 
vested business groups who used political power to advance their business 
interests. The public consensus was that there must be a kind of democracy 
that can bring about strong political and bureaucratic accountability, 
transparency and incorruptability. But matters grew worse before they gOt 
better. There were general elections in March 1992. The military, despite its 
earlier promise not to get involved directly in politics, helped set up a political 
party - the Samakkhitham Party (STP) - which won the largest number of 
parliamentary seats. The STP formed a coalition government with four other 
conservative parties - Chart Thai, Social Action, Prachakorn Thai and 
Rassadorn - and asked General Suchinda Kraprayoon, then the army's 
commander-in-chief who was not a MP, to be PM. The move triggered 
strong resentment among the public, particularly among the middle class -
the mobile phone and Mercedes generation - against the military, which led 
to huge demonstrations in Bangkok in May 1992. The mili rary responded by 
shooting at the demonstrators, killing some fifty people while injuring hundreds 
of others. King Bhumibol Adulyadej intervened to stop the violence and for 
the second time appointed Anand Panyarachun as an interim PM. 
So, within the period of about four years (August 1988 - May 1992), 
the Thai learned many more lessons about their fledgling democracy. 
Firstly, they wanted an elected PM, as in the case of PM Chatichai 
Choonhavan, but detested his style of government, which was not transparent 
and accountable. Parliament was also full of politicians who bought their 
votes and sought government positions to make a "return on their 
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investment". The problems associated with the Chatichai government 
exposed to the Thais the many flaws in their democracy. The gradual 
withdrawal of the 'bureaucratic polity' and the rapid encroachment of 
business people into politics had brought about an enormous increase in 
corruption and abuses of power by politicians for their business gains. At 
the same time, the term "parliamentary dictatorship" was crafted to describe 
the situation where a coalition government formulated policy or acted 
blindly on the basis of its parliamentary majority, without regard to public 
opinion. The privilege of the parliamentary majority was greatly abused. It 
became a dictatorship. It was a dilemma that set in motion a political 
reform movement, aiming to achieve both democracy and good government. 
These were the circumstances within which the new discourse on 
accountability and transparency and good governance emerged, and 
subseq uently became accepted in Thailand. In other words, acco un tability ~ 
or good governance, for that matter - became an organizing language for 
the political reform movement, which culminated in the promulgation of the 
new constitution of 1997, the country's sixteenth since 1932. 
The emergence of the discourse on good governance and accountability 
was also shaped by two very important events. First was the fact that the 
military did not rule the country directly after the 1991 coup. Instead, it 
handpicked a technocrat -turned business executive, Mr Anand Panyarachun, 
to lead the post-coup government. Anand was aware of the public sentimem 
and very familiar with the new language of good governance, which was well-
publicized in the West by that time. It was pan of an international phenomenon 
of the post-Cold War era. The United States, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and the World Bank were also promoting the language of "good 
governance". Anand introduced the concept in Thailand during his prime 
ministership, first between March 1991 and April 1992, and again, further 
popularized it during his second stint as prime minister between June and 
September 1992. He was the first political leader who used the term 
"transparency" and often elaborated how important it was to gain public 
confidence in government affairs. Anand later explained that he deliberately 
relied on the concept of transparency - and good governance ~ as a means 
ro gain political legitimacy in light of the fact that his prime ministership was 
made by the military.3 Anand defines 'transparency' as: 1. public access to 
information; 2. people being informed about the decision-making process; 
3. the government being prepared to tell the people what they think; and 
4. people being able to verifY the government's assertions." The emphasis here 
for Anand was clearly to use the concept of transparency as a means to 
counter corruption and abuses of power by bureaucrats and politicians and to 
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achieve, in the end, better accountability, which formed the basis for the 
political legitimacy of his non-elected government. 
%at Anand did was in line with the notion of good governance as 
promoted by the World Bank at that time - neo-liberal ideology combined 
with the New Public Management and liberal democracy. In 1993, the 
people who first tried to articulate the notion of good governance were 
academics at the Thailand Development Research Institute (TORI), a 
prestigious think-tank, which Anand himself once chaired. Two key authors 
of a research paper at the TDRI, Professor Ammar Siamwalla and Scott 
Christensen, argued in their 1993 publication that the concept of 
"accountability" was absent from the Thai language. s Anand had the good 
fortune of consolidating further what he propagated during his two stints as 
appointed prime minister when he was elected the chairman of the 
Constitutional Drafting Committee, which played a key role in putting 
tOgether a complete draft of the 1997 constitution. 
The second event that helped shape and strengthen the language of 
accountability and transparency was the country's economic meltdown of 
July 1997. Corrupt poU ticians and corporate leaders, who colluded amo ng 
themselves in granting and obtaining loans illegally from banks and financial 
institutions for unproductive investments and for political partronage purposes, 
such as vote-buying, were seen as big contributors to the collapse. In other 
words, corruption and the lack of accountability on the part of the politicians, 
bureaucrats and business leaders were the culprits. The economic crisis therefore 
presented an urgenr need for new legal and institutional mechanisms to 
address those problems. And the proposed constitution, which until that 
point was amacting a lot of opposition from the conservative politicians, 
seemed to have provided all the answers to the country's fundamental ills, 
political and economic. 
Mter the July 1997 crisis, the concept of 'transparency', already 
understOod as encompassing the whole idea of good governance, became 
the organizing language for political reform in Thailand. Theerayuth Boonmi 
was one of the first public intellectuals who articulated the term "good 
governance" in the post-1 997 crisis as a means to get Thailand out of the 
crisis and (Q avoid fumre crises. In fact, many argue that good governance 
- of which accountability is a key part - was seen by many scholars and 
social activists as the means of stabilizing the country. The crisis of 1997 
reinforced the term "good governance", which had become a dominant 
discourse now, incorporating other terms such as transparency and 
accountability, participation, predictability and efficiency in government 
and public administration. 
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THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN ESTABLISHING NEW 
GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Thailand's phenomenal economic growth in the second half of the 1980s 
played a key role in entrenching Thai democracy in the 1990s, as the 
economic boom led to an expansion of the middle/managerial class, who 
were often suspicious of government resuictions in political, economic and 
social life. The middle class served as a core element of civil society. During 
the period of rhree years of the Chatichai administration, it was obvious that 
civil society became stronger. This happened on the back of blossoming of 
new business opportunities and industrial as well as government~owned 
infrastructure projects which among other things contributed to widespread 
corruption in government and private sector. 
The best place to see the extent of rhe influence of civil society on the 
establishment of the new governance in Thailand is through an analysis of the 
drafting of the 1997 constitution, during 1996-97. Some middle class civil 
society activists tried relentlessly, between 1992 and 1995, to get a new 
chatter written to achieve the agenda of"resttucturing the state power, so that 
people will be able to genuinely have checks and balances ... to ptevent 
politicians from abusing their power, and to have a genuine political reform 
institutionalizing the people's participation at every seage of political process 
and from people of different social strata".6 The three main things that most 
concerned the drafters of the Thai constitution were: 1. people's participation 
in the political and policy~making process; 2. people's control of political 
office~holders; and 3. establishing institutions that scrutinize possible abuses 
of power by political office~holders or high~tanking government officials. The 
general belief was that politicians cannot be trusted and the system must 
involve the patticipation of people at all levels of policy~making. The corruption 
and abuses of power by the Chatichai government during 1988-91 left 
people strongly suspicious of political office~holders. 
It was an uphill battle to implement political reform. Politicians were 
dragging theit feet, until a hunget strike in front of the Parliament building 
in 1995 by a social critic and a former politician, Chalard Vorachat, heightened 
the public outcry and triggered a constitutional reform movement. The 
Committee for Democratic Development was set up, which culminated in 
the formation of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) in 1996. The 
CDA was chaired by a former MP, Uthai Pimchaichon, who for years fought 
against the military dictatorship. Incumbent politicians, whose credibility 
had plummeted because of their alleged corrupt behaviour, were deliberately 
excluded from the drafting process for fear that they might hijack the new 
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charter. Instead, the assembly was composed of ninety-nine members, including 
one member each from the seventy-six provinces, eight experts in public law, 
eight expertS in political science or public administration, and seven individuals 
with political or public or constitutional drafting experience. These ninety-
nine men and women (bue mostly men) could be broadly cacegorized as 
representing civil society. 
The only role reserved for the sitting members of the National Assembly 
during the time was to vote on the pool of nominees for the ninety-nine seats 
in the CDA and to either approve or reject the draft constitution as a whole; 
they were not allowed to make amendments to the draft. In the event that the 
House of Representatives rejected the draft, a popular referendum would be 
called_ This ground rule was laid by the CDA's predecessor, the Committee 
for Democratic Development, to guard against possible tampering with the 
draft constitution by politicians who were believed to have already done 
much damage to Thai democracy. To be consistent with this desire of civil 
society, the COA, through its sub-committee, the Constitution Drafting 
Committee (CDC), chaired by Anand Panyarachun, ensured that the drafting 
process involved as many people as possible, representing various sections of 
civil society and professional groups from different partS of the country. 
According to the Public Relations Sub-committee of the CDC, all in all there 
were a total of 843556 people directly participating in the drafting process: 
629,232 in the public consultations stage; 122,585 in the public hearings 
stage throughout 76 provinces; 3,828 in public hearings at a regional level, 
and 87,912 responding to q uestionnaires.7 In addition, there were 300 
organizations including business, industry, agriculture, mass media, various 
professional groups, educational institutions, political parties, democracy 
groups, environmental groups and other non-governmental organizations 
participating at one stage or another of the drafting process. & the Public 
Relations Sub-committee said of the drafting process: "It was a process that 
mobilized brains from allover the country to the extent that has never been 
done before in Thai political history."8 
THE FOUR KEY ACCOUNTABILITY INSTITUTIONS: 
AN ASSESSMENT 
The new constitution reflects public concerns over the failings of elected 
government and the root causes of the economic collapse in 1997. Politicians, 
for example, often colluded with the lowly-regulated private sector, such as 
banks and financial institutions in granting shady loans. Nine key independent 
accountability institutions were established to address these concerns.9 Of 
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these nine institutions, four are most crucial in terms of promoting political 
accountability, checking and balancing the use of powers by the political 
official holders: 1. Elections Commission of Thailand (ECT); 2. National 
Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC); 3.Constitutional Court (CC), 
and; 4. Administrative Court CAC). The Ombudsman, the National Human 
Rights Commission, the National Economic and Social Advisory Council all 
play largely advisory, mediating and monitoring roles, while the State Audit 
and the Auditor-General Offices are largely responsible for bureaucratic 
accountability. The other very important institution, the Broadcasting and 
Telecommunications Commissions, whose responsibilities include prescribing 
regulations, which would prevent the state from having undue power over the 
broadcasting media, has yet to be set up. 
Elections Commission of Thailand 
The Elections Commission of Thailand (ECT) is tasked with administering 
the eleccoral laws including the conducting of all elections for National 
Assembly elections (House of Representatives and Senate), local assemblies 
and local administrators, including voting in referendums, registration of 
parties and candidates, maintenance of the integrity of elections, deciding on 
disputed returns and challenges co elections and public funding ptovisions of 
the law. The establishment of ECT is another bteakthrough in the area of 
eleccoral accountability. In the past the administration of elections was under 
the purview of the Ministry of the Interior, which gave an incumbent 
government an advantage. The minister of the interior could influence 
provincial governors, and officials in the ministry influenced election outcomes 
in favour of the government. This power to administer elections is now 
completely out of the hands ofInterior Ministry officials. One of the major 
concerns of the reformists was the prevention of vote-buying, corruption and 
abuses of power by politicians. A number of provisions have been made co 
prevent or minimize such abuses: 
Firstly, stricter control over expenditure by candidates. The new law on 
Election of the House of Representatives and Senators of 1998, an organic 
law of the new constitution, requires political parties to set up election 
accounts under supervision of qualified accountants, detailing how the money 
is received and spent and to be submitted to the Elections Commission 
within ninety days afrer the election results are announced (Article 43). The 
Elections Commission is to audit the accounts and make them public (Article 
43, paragraph 2). These stipulations are supported further by a provision on 
donations to political parties of the Political Parry Act of 1998. For the first 
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time in Thai parliamentary history, political parties are required to detail 
donations including the names of donors and amounts they donate (Articles 
45, 48). Furthermore, the Political Party Act of 1998, again the first in Thai 
political history, requires the state [Q provide finandal support to the political 
parties (Articles 56--64). 
Secondly, prohibition of giving promises of rewards to woo voters. Article 
44 of the same law prohibits candidates to propose rewards in any forms, 
either to individuals or to organizations, or to intimidate voters. 
Thirdly, vote counting is done at one location, such as the district office 
(there are about 850 districts in Thailand, of 76 provinces), instead of at 
polling stations at the village level as previously done. This measure under 
Article 69 of the 1998 Election Law is designed to prevent vote-buying. By 
previously counting votes at polling stations, which cover a small area, vote-
buyers can more or less verify whether voters actually voted as instructed. In 
the event that the latter did nOt, some form of retribution could then be 
applied. Under the new system, it is not possible for candidates to check 
whether their canvassers actually deliver what they promise because all the 
ballots are mixed together. 
The change in the election administration also allows for greater 
participation by the citizenry through the Elections Commission. Civil society 
organizations and the public in general - in the form of volunteers - have 
been playing a key role in not only moni toring elections but also disseminating 
information about elections, educating the electorate since 2000, the first 
following the promulgation of the new constitution. NGOs, for the purpose 
of elections accountability, form themselves into Provincial Election 
Commissions (PEC). Apart from the PEC, there are NGOs throughout the 
country chat help monitor elections. According to the EeT, there are currently 
165 provincial NGOs and 12 national NGOs registered with the PEe. The 
N GOs also form during election times an Election Monitoring Centre. The 
People's Network for Election in Thailand (P-Net) is another strong network 
of NGOs monitoring elections. PEe and NGOs report cases of electoral 
wrong-doings to EeT, which, in turn investigates. In the 2000 senatorial 
elections, the EeT disqualified some 78 winning candidates on charges of 
electoral wrong-doings, including buying votes, donating for charity, creating 
misunderstanding about his/her qualificarions or achievements, impeding 
their employees from using their right, providing transport to voters in 
exchange for votes, and rigging the vote-counting. During the 200 I lower 
house elections, 30 candidates were summoned to answer charges of electoral 
frauds. In the same elections, the ECT suspended results of65 constituencies 
(out of 400) for vote rigging. Since the new charter has been in operation 
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until the end of2003, the ECT has organized 20 parliamentary elections, 11 
senatorial elections and 49 municipal elections and one tambon (sub-district) 
administrative election. So far, six criminal lawsuits and fout civil suits had 
been filed against senate candidates, and ctiminallaw sui ts against 13 candidates 
for the house of representatives. 
These actions carried out by both the new ECT and the NGOs are 
unprecedented, although critics continue to doubt the effectiveness of the 
organizations in pteventing electoral wrong-doings. 
National Counter.Corruption Commission and 
Constitutional Court 
The National Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC) investigates, 
provides opinions and commences actions in the courts concerning the 
accuracy of declarations of assets and liabilities, and allegations of corruption 
or gross misconduct in office of public officials (including members of the 
National Assembly, Council of Ministers and the judiciary) and candidates 
for office (National Assembly, judges, the military, polke and local 
government officials). The Constitutional Court (CC) determines whether 
Thai laws and draft laws, resolutions of political parties, status of membership 
of the house of representatives, senate, cabinet and ECT, actions of the 
government and its agencies, and questions referred by other courts are 
consistent with the constitution. The CC may deliberate on impeachment 
proceedings concerning the PM, other ministers, members of the National 
Assembly, the president of the Supreme Court of Justke, the president and 
judges of the CC itself, the president of the Supreme Administrative Court, 
the prosecutor-general, election commissioners, the ombudsman, members 
of the State Audit commission, the chief of the Military Judicial Office, 
other judges, public prosecutors, and high ranking officials covered by the 
organic laws on counter corruption. 
Since 2000, the NCCC has investigated and brought charges against a 
number of high-profile politicians, one of which was against Thaksin, who 
was in the end acquitted by the CC of falsely declaring his assets when he was 
deputy PM in 1997. Successful cases in the CC included the one against the 
then secretary-general of the Democrat Patty and interior minister, Sanan 
Kachornprasart for lying in his asset declaration; a former adviser to a health 
minister for colluding in taking bribes from a drug company; an MP for 
falsely declaring his assets; a deputy minister for false asset declaration; and a 
former minister for health, Rakldat Suthana, for taking bribes from a drug 
company. These politicians have been barred from running for political office 
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for five years by the Cc. In the case of the former health minister, because the 
bribery is a criminal case, he was also prosecuted by the Supreme Court's 
criminal tribunal for political office-holders. He was sentenced to fifteen 
years in jail and some 300 million baht (US$ 8 million) was confiscated. He, 
however, jumped bailed. 
The Administrative Court 
The Administrative Court (AC) hears and determines disputes between 
government agencies (including local government organizations) and private 
individuals and also disputes between or among government agencies. During 
its two-year operation, there have been some 3,000 complaints being brought 
to the court, but it has been able to deliberate on only a few hundred cases. 
However, there were two cases from which the court can be judged as playing 
a crucial role in blunting power abuses by the government of the day. The 
first one was in 2002 when the government's Anti-Money Laundering Office 
(AMLO), a body created to investigate drug dealers and other criminals, 
asked for the financial records of journalists from The Nation and another 
critical daily, the Thai Post following a series of their critical reports on 
government. The journalists filed their complaints with the AC, which 
quickly issued an injunction calling the probe illegal and ordering the AMLO 
to suspend the investigations. 
The second case was in early 2003 when the court upheld a ruling by a 
lower coun that nullified the selection of fourteen nominees to the National 
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). The main contention was that the 
nominees were not true representatives of the industry but cronies of the 
government. As Thaksin owned the country's largest telecommunications 
company, the Shin Corp. PLC, the PM was alleged to have manipulated the 
selection of members for the commission, who would playa key role in such 
issues as conversion of state concessions and the privatization of state 
telecommunications agencies. 
WEAKENING ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
IN THAILAND? 
Public expectations of the new constitution to enhance both political and 
bureaucratic accountability and transparency were understandably high. The 
new accountability institutions have now been largely operational and, so far, 
the results have been mixed. In the area of electoral politics, vote buying and 
other foems of abuses and frauds persist. Atlegations of corrupti.on against 
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politicians continue, but only a handful of cases have resulted in prosecutions. 
This has led to the perception that these institutions are not effective enough 
in cleaning up Thai politics or pteventing abuses of power by politicians. 
However, the fact that these institutions have been vigorous in their 
pursuits of political wrongdoings demonstrate, among other things, how 
far Thailand has come in terms of promoting political and bureaucratic 
accountability. Equally significant is the fact that these proceedings against 
political office holders are great contributions to public education. The 
media interest in each case has been enormous. Furthermore, these 
organizations need more time to strengthen themselves in terms of personnel 
and expertise. For example, the NCCC has a staff of about 500 but it has 
to deal each year with about 10,000 financial reports and thousands of 
complaints about politicians and bureaucrats at all levels. Most of these 
accountability institutions are currently relying on officials on secondment 
from other government agencies. Obviously, there is no balance between 
the public expectation and the reality and capacity of these institutions. 
Moreover, the attitude of the government of the day is crucial to the 
promotion of accountability and transparency, or good governance. During 
the Ch uan Leekpai government between 1997 and 200 1, there was much 
vibrancy in the business of promoting accountability, particularly in the 
area of corruption suppression. This reflected the kind of political leadership 
on the part of Ch uan Leekpai, known as one of Thailand's "Mr Clean", and 
a persistent democratic fighter over the past thirty years. . 
Under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was elected in January 
200 1 and formed the first government under the new charter, the atmosphere 
has changed dramatically, as far as the promotion of accountability is concerned. 
Thaksin, a telecom business tycoon and one of the country's richest persons, 
has been perceived as lacking an interest in promoting political transparency 
and accountability. Thaksin is nor able to shake off - or to prove beyond 
doubt - the public perception that he uses political power to serve his 
business interests and those of his political colleagues. In fact, as mentioned 
earlier, Thaksin brought with him to the high office of PM the stain of 
fighting against a National Counter-Corruption Commission charge of falsely 
declaring his assets. He won the case by a very slim margin of 8-7 in the 
Constitutional Court but with great controversy. Thaksin's popularity and 
strong electoral mandate, based on his populist policies, have made it possible 
for him to dodge accusations over conflict of interests or lack of transparency 
and accountability. Under Thaksin, the language of accountability seems to 
be going through a rough time competing with the language of economic 
gro"Wth, nationalism and international competitiveness. Thaksin pays little 
Thailand: A Dim Case of Participatory Democracy 111 
attention to, if not having total contempt of, promoting accountability and 
transparency in government. He especially ignores the kind of accountability 
as envisioned by the new constitution, which is horizontal accountability. W 
There have been numerous incidents to substantiate this. 
Firstly, Thaksin, with an overwhelming majority and being popular, is 
alleged to have tried to influence the accountability institutions, including 
the Constitutional Court, the Elections Commission and the Senate. Somkiat 
Onwimon, one of the senators who are cridcal ofThaksin says, 
The parliament is weak. The House of Representatives is under the 
control of political parries. The Senate is very fragmented. In fact, the 
Senate is increasingly encroached on by the government. This is evidenced 
in the way the Senate votes. It is clear that the number of Senators who 
vote in favour of government keeps increasing between 50 and 80 (out 
of 200), especially when the government is determined to pass a bill 
which is favourable to the telecommunications businesses (owned by 
Thaksin and his cronies).ll 
Secondly, the National Broadcasting and Telecommunication 
Commissions have not yet been set up by this government as required by 
the constitution. The agencies are to regulate the allocation of frequencies 
and other telecommunications operations. Thaksin, being the largest owner 
of the telecommunications business, is clearly seen as blocking the creation 
of commissioners who might go against his business interests. In the later 
part of 2003, the government decided - through an Emergency Decree, 
not by an act of parliament - to change the arrangement between the state 
telecom agencies and private concessionaire from concession fees to excise 
tax. Excise tax is fixed at a particular rate whereas concession fees would be 
determined by the rate of profits. The arrangement benefits Thaksin's 
mobile phone companies. 
Thirdly, another conflict of in terest was the case of a concession Thaksin's 
family received from the state to run a television station, iTv. In fact, the 
PM's Office, the concession granting agency, decided to reduce concession 
fees to the television station, thus handing huge business benefits to 
Thaksin's family. 
Fourthly, controlling the media. Through advertising money from 
Thaksin's business empire and his colleagues and the huge budget various 
ministries allocate for public relations work, there is great financial gain for 
the media to be on the side of the government. Self-censorship in the Thai 
media community is quite commonplace now. Owning a television station is, 
of course, a form of media controL 
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Fifthly; Thaksin's concept of CEO~governors, who are keys to the country's 
regional administration (there are seventy~six provinces), to promote efficiency 
and the country's international competitiveness, goes against the participation 
and promotion of horizontal accountability. This undermines the efforts to 
decentralize powers and responsibilities from central - and regional -
bureaucracies to local people. Decentralization is seen as an integral part of 
promoting accountability and transparency, in the sense that local people are 
em powered to participate more directly in policy~ making affecting them. 
Sixth, the Thaksin government has a low level of tolerance for criticism. 
Thaksin tends to dismiss criticisms as damaging and irresponsible and to 
promote his views as the only right ones. He has said that democracy is not 
his goaL His main concern is to produce prosperity for the people. This is not 
about their participation in political or policy~making. 
Lastly, there is an over-emphasis on economic growth. There is no 
balance between democratic development and economic development. 
Evidence of new economic governance includes the creation of the SME 
bank, the People's Bank, the Office of Capitalization, the transfotming of 
underground businesses - illegal lotteries - into mainstream business, 
taking money into the government coffers. Thaksin is a strong believer in 
economic performance as a basis for political legitimacy. And to some 
degree, he has been successful in using economic growth to pacifY middle 
class discontent. 
LEAVING PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE, 
RETURNINC TO AUTHORITARIANISM 
The Thaksin government is dominated by seven large corporate empires, 
which accounted for about 20 per cent of all the share value in the Thai stock 
market in 2002.12 This is a government that is formed and run by big 
businesses. In addition, with a background as a former police officer who still 
maintains strong links with former classmates in the police force and the 
military, Thaksin occupies a very strong and enviable political position. 
Furthermore, he also enjoys the backing of more conservative bureaucratic 
force of the Ministry of the Interior that maintains strong bureaucratic 
network countrywide. Even more significantly, the two most politically 
influential pillars of big businesses and conservative bureaucratic forces are 
brought together under Thaksin's CEO~style of management - a top-down, 
quick and decisive administration. Thaksin is therefore unavoidably perceived 
as more authoritarian than democratic. 
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The flip side of this governance style under Thaksin is the fact that civil 
society organizations (some 17,000) are more or less stifled. They are not able 
to playa more significant role in the furthering consolidation of democracy 
in the post-1997 period. Simply put, they have lost out to the above-
mentioned coalition of capitalists and conservative bureaucratic/repressive 
forces. The main vehicle for the new political coalition in capturing the 
power of the Thai state is the electoral process. Civil society groups have 
become bystanders in the politics of electioneering, the very thing that 
matters the most in a parliamentary system. Civil society groups have been 
brushed aside by the PM as troublemakers. At the same time, the role of 
technocrats - particularly in planning agencies - has been reduced. 
The Emergence of a One-party Government 
The Thaksin government is overwhelmingly strong. Thaksin's Thai Rak 
Thai Parry has an absolute majority in the house of representatives, the first 
such majority in the political history of Thailand. But Thaksin is attempting 
to make his party even bigger and stronger through mergers with and 
acquisition of other political parties. The PM has already absorbed a few 
political parties into his Thai Rak Thai Party since taking over power, with 
337 of the 500 seats in the lower house. He expelled a coalition partner 
who refused to amalgamate with his party. As the constitution requires a 
minimum of200 votes in the parliament to launch a no-confidence motion 
against the PM, the opposition is effectively powerless. Thaksin's position 
as PM is unassailable. This has contributed to strong executive and weaker 
legislative, rendering ineffective the system of checks and balances in 
governmenr. For Thaksin, this is a kind of "still politics" that he wants in 
order to forge ahead with economic growth, and any political opposition is 
branded "unconstructive" or "unpatriotic". 
Heavy Reliance on Repressive State Apparatuses 
Thaksin's one-man, top-down and decisive style of administration goes well 
with repressive state apparatuses, such as the police force. This has led to a 
major problem in terms of public accountability. For example, the case of the 
government campaign against drug trafficking in the early part of 2003 that 
led to some 2,500 suspectS being killed by extra-judicial means. Thaksin 
brushed aside protests from the National and Human RightS Commission 
and an international one. 
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Deepening Marketization and Commercialization 
of the rural areas 
Thaksin, through village funds and easy credits from the People's Bank and 
the Bank for Agriculture, has also been able to incorporate the tural areas and 
their people into one whole national market and, in fact, the global market. 
Effectively, the rural areas have now been re-organized into supporting or 
helping expand capitalist production. The ideology of consumerism is replacing 
democratic/participatory ideology. The marketization or globalization of the 
rural areas is also a very effective means to isolate NGOs who would 
traditionally rely on the rural people for theif legitimacy. As NGOs are key 
players in checks and balances against government actions, the isolation 
NGOs tram the grassroots people has weakened political accountability. 
CONCLUSION 
The new constitution of 1997 aimed to establish a stronger participatory 
democracy and hence strong accountability and transparency in government. 
But the charter seems to have failed to produce the desired outcome 
because capitalists and corporate elites have captured the means by which 
state power is achieved, that is the electoral process. And because the basis 
of political legitimacy in Thailand has now been based to very large degree 
on electoral process, elections are often used as a means to justify the 
actions of the Thaksin government. Because of its electoral dominance, the 
Thaksin government tends to ignore claims from civil society that the 
government is in fact undermining accountability and transparency, and in 
fact condoning actions that go against the principles of good governance. 
Thaksin's government emphasizes on conforming to international market 
forces at the expense of the principles of good governance such as 
transparency and accountability. This, in turn, generates political resistance 
and opposition ftom tradidonalists and civil society groups, which could 
lead political instability in Thailand, yet again. 
Notes 
The chapter was written before the coup that toppled the govern men t of Prime 
Minister Thaksin Sh inawatra on the 19 5 eptember 2006. The military group, 
called the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR), gave a number of reasons for 
the takeover. First, the coup was to res[Qre democracy and accountability, which 
will entails investigations of cases of corruption and abuses of power allegedly 
committed by Thaksin and former members of his cabinet. Secondly, the coup 
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was claimed to help prevent possible violent clashes between pro- and anti-
Thaksin gtoUpS, something that had gradually fermented for over ten months 
prior to the coup. Whether one believes the rhetoric of the coup leaders or not, 
it was clear that the military seizure of power did help break a political stalemate 
between Thaksin government and his opponents prior to 19 September. 
This stalemate had COSt the Thaksin government political legitimacy and, if 
prolonged, would have damaged Thailand even more. The key source of the 
political stalemate is in faCt central to my argument in the chapter: 1). Thaksin's 
capture of the electoral process that had resulted in his domination of the 
parliamentary politics, and; 2). The system of accountability was to a large 
degree undermined by the deposed prime minister. 
The junta's appointment of a former army commander-in-chief, General 
Surayud Chuianont, signals a clear departure from the image of a corrupt 
governmen t under Thaksin. Surayud is known for his professionalism, in tegrity, 
honesty and incorruptibility. But this may not be enough for the military leaders 
to convince Thais that they did not intend to ding on to power. Even though 
there was popular support for the coup, it would be wrong to assume that Thais 
equate suppOrt for the takeover with support for long-term military involvement 
in politics. Some might argue that a clean governmem appointed by a military 
would still be more credible than the electoral politics that elects a corrupt 
govern men t. In the meantime, Thaksin's electoral mandate - the main criterion 
on which a government's legitimacy is judged, particularly by the West - can 
never be totally discredited, even if one questions the ways he won it. Thaksin 
is a friend of globalizers, not only in Thailand but also abroad. He may be down, 
but by no means is he Out. 
Laothamata5 Anek, Business Associatiom and the New Political Economy ofThailand: 
From Bureaucratic Polity to Liberal Corporatism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). 
Anand Panyarachun, "Sitthi seri parp kong prachachon kab krabuan karn 
yurhitham tam rattathammanoon chabbab patchuban" [Rights and Liberties of 
the People and the Justice Process under the New Constitution], in Tit tan 
krabuan karn yuthitham thai nai satawat mai [Directioos of Thai Justice Process 
in the New Century], edited by Kittipong Kittayarak (Bangkok: Thailand 
Research Fund, 2000), pp. 50~62. 
Prasarn Maruekkapitak et al., Anand Panyarachun: Chewit khwamkit lae gnan 
kong ardeet nayok rattamontri song samai [Anaod Panyarachun: Life, Thoughts, 
and Achievements of the Twice Prime Minister], 4th edition (Bangkok: Amarin 
Press, 1999), p. 172. 
Michael Connors, "Framing the People's Constitution", in Reforming Thai Politics, 
edited by Duncan McCargo (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies), 
p.45. 
Public Relations Subcommittee of Constitutional Drafting Assembly, Draft, 
Constitution for the Kingdom of Thailand: People's Version (Bangkok: Bangchak 
Pic, 1997), p. 163. 
116 
10 
11 
12 
Ibid., p. 170. 
Ibid. 
Surin Maisrikrod 
These nine institutions are 1. Elections Commission of Thailand (ECT); 
2. National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC); 3.Constitutional COUf[ 
(CC); 4. Administrative Court (AC); 5. The Office of Parliamentary Ombudsman 
(OPO); 6. National Human Rights Commission (NHRC); 7. State Audit 
Commission and Office of the Auditor-General (SAC/OAG); 8. The National 
Economic and Sodal Advisory Council (NESAC); 9. Independent Broadcasting 
and Telecommunications Commissions (NBC and NTC). 
See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Horiwncal Accountability in New Democracies", in 
Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, edited by Bernard E. Brown, 9th 
edition (Fort Worth: Hartcourt College Publishers, 1998). 
Somkiat Onwimon, "A One-Party Government: Feasibility, Implications on 
Thai Politics, and Some Concerns", Sor Sor Ror Newsletter of the Club for the 
Former Members of the Constitutional DraftingAssembfJt (First Volume, 2004): 9. 
Rattapong Sornsuparb and Prachak Namprasarnthai, The Economic System under 
Thaksino's Model (Bangkok: V-Express, 2003), pp. 91-93. 
